Volume 27

Issue 1

Article 11

November 1920

Adverse Possession--What Constitutes--Occupancy Under A Parol
Gift
W. F. B.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
W. F. B., Adverse Possession--What Constitutes--Occupancy Under A Parol Gift, 27 W. Va. L. Rev. (1920).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss1/11

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

B.: Adverse Possession--What Constitutes--Occupancy Under A Parol Gif
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

It is submitted that the majority of the Court seem to have failed to appreciate the nature of the problem at hand, and that Mr.
Justice Ritz, in his dissenting opinion, sponsors what is apparently
the better view.
-M. T. V. H.

RECENT CASES.
ADVERSE POSSESSION-WHAT

CONSTITUTES-OccuPANCY

UNDER

A PAROL GIFT.-An oil and gas company agreed to convey one-half
acre of surface land to a school board as soon as the land was
measured in metes and bounds. In reliance on such promise the
school board entered, built a school house and held possession for
fifteen years without receiving the deed as promised. A controversy then arose between the parties as to the rights to the oil and
gas under this land. The question was whether such entry and
occupancy were adverse so that title to the land and to the oil
and gas would be acquired under it. Held, No title was acquired.
Bumpus et ;l v. Ohio Cities Gas Co., et at., 103 S. E. 62 (W.
Va. 1920).
It is well settled authority that where one enters land pursuant to a parol gift and holds exclusive possession, such possession
is adverse. Sumner v. Stevens, 47 Mass. 337; Schafer v. Hauser,
111 Mich. 622. Virginia is the only state holding such possession
subordinate to the owner's title. Clarke v. McClure, 10 Gratt. 305
(Va). In the principal case there was a promise without consideration and the relation existing between the parties was purely
that of donor-donee. In support of its conclusion the West Virginia court cites two cases which hold that possession acquired
under an executory contract does not form the basis of adverse
possession. James Sons Co. v. Hutchinson, 79 W. Va. 389, 90 S.
E. 1047; Hudson v. Putney, 14 W. Va. 561. Adverse possession
is founded on a claim of ownership. Schafer v. Hauser, supra.
Possession, under an executory contract, however, differs from that
under a parol gift. The executory contract shows that the vendee
has entered in recognition of the true owner and therefore he cannot hold adversely without some hostile assertion of ownership.
Greeno v. Munson, 9 Vt. 37. But where there is a parol gift of
the land, as in tlie principal case, the donee enters as owner and
the donor admits such ownership. Though the court's decision on
the question of adverse possession is open to criticism the actual
holding in the case may be supported. The school board acquired
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the surface land by a claim of right, but they asserted no owner
ship over the oil and gas that would give them title to it by
the runnig of the statutory period. In other words, the conclusion
of the court was right had they confined their decision to the oil
-W. F. B.
and gas rights.
CONSIDERATION-WHAT

CONSTITUTES

THE

CONSIDERATION.-A

and B mutually agreed to allow C to receive the dividends on the
stock owned by them in the X Co. The X Co. paid dividends
to C, in accordance with this agreement, for four years. A then
instructed the X Co. to pay no further dividends on his stock to
C. The X Co. filed a bill of interpleader to determine to whom the
dividends should be paid. Held, the dividends on A's stock must
be paid to A. Banner Window Glass Co. v. Barriat et al., 102 S.
E. 726 (W. Va. 1920).
A West Virginia statute gives a party the right to sue on a
contract made for his benefit. W. VA. CODE, c. 71, § 2. The
question here, then, is whether there was a contract. This depends
upon whether there was a consideration for A's promise. A benefit to the promisor, or a detriment to the promisee, is a valuable
consideration. See WALD's POLLOCK, CONTRACTS, 3 ed., 185 n.
1. If the promisee suffers a detriment, it is immaterial whether
or not the promisor is benefited. German v. Gilbert, 83 Mo. App.
411; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256. A detriment
consists in giving up some legal right or privilege. German v.
Gilbert, supra; Hamer v. Sidway, supra; Ballard v. Burton, 64
Vt. 387, 24 Atl. 769; Bainbridge v. Firmstone, 8 A & E. 743, 112
Eng. Reprint 1019; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309, 113 Eng. Reprint 210. Mutual promises are sufficient consideration for one
another. Buckinghtam v. Ludlum, 40 N. J. Eq. 422; Phillips v.
Preston, 5 How. 278 (U. S.); Walke v. McGehee, 11 Ala. 273.
See WALDI"s POLLOcK, CONTRACTS, 3 ed., 201. The promise, and
not the performance, is the consideration. ITWalke v. McGeltee,
supra; Buckingham v. Ludlum, supra; United & Globe Rubber
Mfg. Cos. v. Conrad et al., 80 N. J. L. 286, 78 Atl. 203. In the
principal case it is difficult to see why B's promise was not sufficient consideration. B was not obliged to enter into this agreement with A, nor to make A the promise he did. If B had promised to pay and had paid his share of the dividends to A, it would
be clear that B had suffered a legal detriment. He suffers the
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